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ABSTRACT
Interlocal cooperation in the delivery of services
is the subject of this thesis project.

The study surveys

the types of cooperation communities can engage in.

It

also examines how three communities cooperate in the provision of police and public works services.
Interlocal cooperation can be defined as collaborative efforts undertaken by two or more communities.

In this

study, cooperation is looked at in terms of the provision of
services.

Such cooperation can be formal or informal,

single function or multi-function, and supplementary or
complete.

In any case, it is seen as a means for improving

the delivery of services.
Local services are financed through property taxes.
People, these days, are demanding cuts in their property
taxes.

At the same time, they continue to demand services.

The pressure is on administrators to find ways to provide
services more efficiently and effectively.
Administrative and organizational constraints hamper
efforts to cooperate formally.

The administrators of service

systems of ten have the power to make verbal agreements
among themselves.

Such agreements are more amenable to the

variety of administrative and organizational conditions
which exist in a group of conununities.
iii

As a result, it was

iv
not shocking to find that cooperative efforts undertaken by
the three communities examined are primarily informal.
Informal cooperation has its place and communities should
cooperate with one another in the delivery of services in
whatever formal or informal manner their organizational and
administrative situations necessitate. ,
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I.

ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF
INTERLOCAL COOPERATION

Interlocal cooperation in the delivery of services
can be formal or informal, single function or multi-function
partial or total, functionally oriented or geographically
oriented, and dependent or independent.

It can be called

a council of government, a common council, a special district, a metropolitan commission or a collaborative.

Or,

it may just exist through verbal agreements or written
contracts.
Formal systems are based on agreements, agreements
made legal by legislation or contracts.
based on verbal agreements.

Informal ones are

Some states have made formal

agreements among communities possible through legislation.
These agreements provide communities with a mechanism
allowing them to jointly exercise powers in the delivery
of services, formerly and solely the authority of local
governments.

They can be used to allow communities to

jointly undertake functions and responsibilities which they
already could (and did) individually.

They can also be

used to allow communities to collectively purchase supplies
and facilities.
The advantge of formal rather than informal is that
formal agreements are legally secured, a written contract
obligates all parties to participation.

This becomes
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important when an organization is set up to coordinate and
administer over a jointly needed service system.

Each

community has financial investments involved which they
may wish to protect.

Sustained cooperation is necessary in

order to protect investments.

Formal agreements, such as

legislation and contracts, prevent communities from "pulling
out" unexpectedly.
Generally, municipalities are restricted to formal
contracts or informal agreements which are specifically
stated in their charters, or implied in legislative acts
and constitutional provisions.

The powers of local govern-

ment usually end at their boundaries.

All states, however,

do authorize both formal and informal interlocal agreements
for some purposes.

For example, they can authorize the

collective purchase of computers, the provision of mass
transit, operation of parks and the collection and disposal
of solid waste.
In Pennsylvania, interlocal governments which
formally collaborate in the operation of one or more
functions

(the delivery of one or more services) form

''municipal authorities 11

1
•

They are allowable under a 1945

act, the Municipal Authority Act.

This legislation gives

powers to all types of local governments, acting alone or
in cooperation with one another.

The local municipalities

must adopt an ordinance . or resolution setting up the
authority.

The ordinance would be similar for all the

communities involved.

The Secretary of the Commonwealth

3

reviews the ordinances for conformance with legal requirements.

Finally, a certificate of incorporation is issued

creating the authority.

Communities can later withdraw

from joint authorities if the authorities have not
incurred any debts.

If the authority consents, other

communities can become a part of them.
Local governments may or may not specify the
authority's function.

It can provide all the services or

functions of local governments (except local administration)
so long as it does not duplicate them.

These restrictions

are intended to ensure that policy-making remains a local
function and that competition between local municipal
services and the authority's areawide services does not
occur.

The ·authority can provide revenue producing

services such as bridges, flood control projects, parking
facilities and shopping centers.

After its formation, the

sponsoring communities can increase or decrease the number
of functions of the authority.
The authorities have governing bodies which are
selected by the local governments which create them.

If

two or more communities are involved, the authority's
governing body must have at least one number from each
sponsoring local government.

Members of the governing body

of the authority must be residents of the communities whose
governments appointed them.
Pennsylvania's municipal authorities are dependent
special district governments.

They lack sufficient fiscal

4

independence and administrative autonomy to be independent.
Localities supply the authorities with most or all of their
money.

They have no "taking powers".
This is the situation with all dependent special

district governments.

Although in some instances they may

have considerable fiscal and administrative independence,
their financial arrangements are almost always subject to
review and revision by the parent localities.

In addition,

approval of the special district's plans or actions is
required by either the executive or legislative body of the
parent governments.

Officers of the special district

government, usually, are appointed by the chief executive
or governing body of the parent governments, or are actually
comprised of officials from the parent governments.
The Census Bureau differentiates independent from
dependent special districts by saying that independent
special districts "exist as an organized entity" with
"governmental characteristics" and "substantial autonomy".

2

Independent special districts do have more control over
their finances.

They usually assess the communities within

their jurisdiction for the services they provide, whereas
dependent districts must accept what is appropriated to
them.

Agreements are formally secured by contracts.

Independent special districts have their own bureaucracies
and often have a board of directors or an executive council
which determines policies.
units of government.

They are virtually autonomous

They employ and dismiss personnel,

5

purchase equipment, and determine the quantity and quality
of service{s) they will deliver and the procedures or
methods they will use to deliver them.

They can exist for

a single purpose (the provision of one service to communities) or for multiple purposes (the provision of several
services).
In Massachusetts, for example, the Metropolitan
District Commission (MDC) is an independent, multi-functional,
partial, functionally oriented, cooperative service system.
It is an independent special district service organization.
It is not subject to scrutinization by local governments.
It owns the resources from which it provides services (such
as reservoirs for culinary water) , and provides those
services on a contract basis to individual communities.

It

provides a variety of services, such as water, sewerage,
and parks and recreation.

Its services are intended to

supplement those systems already operated by local governments.
Some special district governments provide only
supplementary services, such as the MDC.

These organiza-

tions provide services over and above those already provided
by local governments.

The services they provide usually

involve the meeting of multi-jurisdictional needs.

For

example, the MDC owns and operates a park system extending
along the Charles River.

This is a recreation service

extending through many communities.
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Councils of government (COG's) are another type of
collective system based on interlocal cooperation.

Local

officials voluntarily come together in councils of governments to discuss problems.

They lack operating and

enforcement powers and, therefore, are often used in
contradiction to their purpose.

Proposals for cooperative

activity are talked about until everyone is tired of them
and they forget them.

This type of status quo organiza-

tion, although the discussions generated by it can be
helpful, often hampers other attempts for both formal and
informal cooperative agreements.
Local governments sometimes join together in common
councils.

These are merely councils of governments with a

different name.

They, like COG's, are formed to resolve

conflicts about areawide issues.

They are a mechanism for

coping with alternatives, implications and choices.
However, common councils run into the same pitfalls.

Like

councils of governments they tend to be unresponsive to the
general public.

Their participants are from the bureau-

cracies of the local governments involved, thus twice
removed from the general public.

In addition, they tend to

focus on physical development.
There is potential for using councils of governments
and common councils for promoting interlocal cooperation
and for being a policy-making body or an implementing
organization for such agreements.

participating represen-

tatives could be elected from the general public of the

/
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co1tU11unities involved instead of, or as well as, from the
bureaucracies of the member governments.

With representa-

tion of the affected public, policy decisions relating to
the public interests involved could be improved.

In

addition, a more diverse spectrum of issues might be raised,
such as those relating to social problems.

The councils

must recognize that poverty, deprivation and discrimination
in one section of a region have consequences to the entire
region.

The councils might then function as they were

designed to, an organization to assist and advise individual
local policy-makers regarding policies about areawide
issues.

They might then promote interjurisdictional agree-

ments for cooperation which reflect the interests and needs
of the areawide co1tU11unity.
County and township governments are two other
mechanisms for fostering interlocal cooperation.

County

governments exist everywhere while townships exist in a
dozen or so states.

There are both active county govern-

ments, which deliver services, and county governments
which exist only in name.

The majority of active county

governments are outside of New England and are most active
where unincorporated areas exist, such as in the Midwest,
the South and some areas of the West Coast.

Townships

exist primarily in the Northeast and the Midwest.

However,

in the Midwest counties are taking over most of the
functions which townships used to be responsible for.

The

most active townships exist in Long Island and Upstate New York.
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Both these governmental units already exist in many
areas and could be activated for the purpose of fostering
interlocal cooperation.
idea, however.

There are shortcomings to this

Their jurisdictional boundaries are fixed

and have been for some time.

Patterns of development (and

therefore the locations and patterns of activity) of the
decades since they were instituted do not respect their
boundaries.

Therefore, the needs and problems of people

arising from their location and activity do not contain
themselves within individual counties and townships.

And

even if several counties were to get together, the problems
might affect merely a portion of the communities in each
and involvement of the remainder of the communities would
be wasteful and would decrease any economies which might
have accrued from collective action.

Townships are smaller

units but problems may involve communities of two or three
of them leading to the same results.
Another formal arrangement of interlocal cooperation
involves metropolitan governments.

These can be called

conference, councils, commissions, and associations.
However, they are merely cooperative governments formed by
bringing together one or more large cities and some or all
of the suburban communities (and/or counties) about them
in an attempt to more efficiently and effectively meet
their collective needs and problems.

They can take the

form of councils of governments, common councils, special
districts, or even collaboratives.

Metropolitan governments
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serve the same purposes as other interlocal cooperative
organizations--meeting areawide needs, solving multijurisdictional problems.

The only difference is that the

focus is on metropolitan regions instead of on a collection
of small and similar communities.

The relationship of a

city to its neighboring communities tends to be different
than the relationships among small communities.
dependence is different.

Inter-

In a metropolitan area,

interdependence is between the city and each individual
community; whereas, in an area of small communities,
interpendence is each between each other.

Therefore,

systems of metropolitan cooperation must be distinguished
from non-metropolitan ones.
Many communities participate in mechanisms formalizing cooperation.

However, the Advisory Commission on

Intergovernmental Relations has reported that it is not
uncommon to find administrators of service systems in
communities making informal agreements with one another.

3

Many communities realize that there will be times when
their service systems alone will not be able to cope with
a problem or meet a need.

As a result, they allow their

administrators discretion in making agreements.

The

administrators know the limitations of their service
systems.

They know what type of cooperative ventures they

can manage.

They also know what types they will need in

the future.

It is therefore delegated to them to decide
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what, how and when to jointly undertake functions or to
provide or accept services from one another.
Many communities see informal cooperation as an
alternative to the establishment of and participation in
formal organizations.

It does require more effort on the

part of administrators to initiate cooperation because there
is no forum which would facilitate it, and, there is no
formal structure to cooperation which takes place informally.
Informal agreements are based on mutual trust and respect
among administrators.
potential for abuse.

With no legal contract there is
The Advisory Commission on Inter-

governmental Relations has found, however, that communities
are willing to take the risks to avoid the "red tape''
involved with formal systems. 4

Informal cooperation allows

agreements to be flexible enough to meet the diversity of
problems which confront administrators, and to meet them
quickly.
Local communities are both production and consumption units.

However, because of problems inherent in both

activities, communities must cooperate with each other.
Whether cooperation is formal or informal, three issues
become critical to its success.
economics and administration.
the following section.

They are politics,
The three are reviewed in

II.

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE

ISSUES ·INVOLVED IN INTERLOCAL COOPERATION
Local governments could be considered basic
building blocks in solving areawide problems.
are not isolated from one another.

Communities

There are issues dealing

with the delivery of services which do cut across local
boundaries.

These issues must be dealt with, and dealt

with on a cooperative basis.

Cooperative actions, there-

fore, can improve the capability of local governments to
serve people.
Political issues surface when cooperative service
delivery systems are mentioned.

One of the major ones is

that of centralization versus decentralization.

This

issue itself is a complex amalgam of other issues such
as equity, economic efficiency, citizen access and control,
and local autonomy.

In promoting cooperative service

delivery systems we are promoting some degree of
centralization.
The equity of regional service delivery systems is
one of the things which is often questioned.

Can such a

system provide services impartially or fairly to all?
some be favored and others forgotten?

Will

As the number of

people being served increases, and as service delivery
systems grow to meet their collective needs, can justice
to done to individual needs or the needs of small groups
within the region.
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The question could be directed toward individual
communities.
equitable?

Are separate local service systems
One of the functions of the level of services

a community provides is its wealth, or the wealth of its
residents.

Therefore, it follows that there is a tendency

for wealthier communities to spend more on services than
those who are not as financially secure.
Areawide delivery of services could increase equity
within a region.

It could do so by doubling as a mechanism

for the redistribution of wealth.

Communities who partici-

pate in cooperative arrangements usually do so for
benefits.

Wealthier communities could subsidize the extra

services for

poorer ones if three conditions existed.

The wealthier communities desire a higher level of services
than the poorer ones.

Only one level of services are

to be provided throughout the region.

The poorer communities

couldn't pay for more than a level which is significantly
lower than that desired by the wealthy.

They would

probably do this, too, if the amount they were saving
by being part of the cooperative system were greater than
the subsidy they had to pay.
The economic efficiency of cooperative systems is
another issue.

Will such a system increase economic

efficiency; or, will it, in fact, decrease efficiency because
it increases the complexity of administrative interrelationships?

The theory of economies of scale suggests that it
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will increase economic efficiency; however, other
theories suggest that the new bureaucracy which is created,
will, in fact, decrease efficiency, reducing or eliminating
benefits from economies of scale.
the field of political science.
spans of control.

One such theory is from
It deals with administrative

As an organization or administrative

unit becomes larger, hiatuses develop in the chain of
command.

These gaps between superiors and subordinates

grow as an agency gets larger.

As they do, administrative

effectiveness decreases, followed by similar losses in
efficiency.

Filling in the gaps requires more people

which cost more money, thereby reducing further the benefits
derived from economies of scale.
Another issue at hand is that of citizen access and
control.

This issue deals with the proximity of the

governmental unit (in this case the administration of one
or more service systems) to the people.
issue is a dilemma of democracy:

Basic to this

active participation

versus the need to obtain a consensus.

While enlightened

and responsive governmental action can result from
dialogues between people and officials, so too can
chaos and often inaction.

However, a close proximity of

the people to governmental units which provide them with
services can prevent and expose corruption, foster
innovation (by facilitating the use of residents to
assist staff), and allow for easy and timely feedback
(and interaction in general).
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The next issue is local autonomy.

It is a sensitive

issue in some parts of the country, especially New
England.

Local governments are a unit of the political

system of this country through which people have come
to trust that they can have an effective say in policymaking.

Local governments provide a variety of services,

and can provide various levels of services.

Different

communities have different value sets, different needs,
different incomes.

Decisions must be made within each

community as to the appropriate or desirable level of
services.

These are policy decisions and are made by the

people for whom the services are provided, the residents of
each community.
combinations

Since communities differ, the levels and

of services in each will differ somewhat.

Thus, local governments are a workable unit through
which people can participate to tailor services to their
needs.
In larger cities neighborhood organizations are
becoming mediums through which people exercise their
policy-making rights.

These organizations have become

surrogates of the small community's political environment.
As cities have grown in population,

so has the need for

their service delivery systems to grow.

As the service

systems have grown, so have the governments in general, in
order to accommodate, coordinate and administer services.
More people means that each individual, and their particular
needs, is less important in decisions regarding combinations
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and levels of services.

Large numbers of people become

so heterogeneous that the community's needs in terms of
services become amorphous.

This, and the increasing .size

of the bureaucracy in general, give a life to the bureaucracy all its own.

Policy decisions are virtually

irrelevant with respect to small communities of people.
Neighborhood organizations, as smaller, somewhat more
homogeneous groups of people are seen as a way to make policy
decisions relevant and to give municipal service systems
a definable unit to which to tailor service delivery.
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations has given a word of caution to localities considering consolidation or centralization of functions.

It sums

up the major concerns of this issue.
Every Unit of government should be responsible
for a sufficient number of functions so that its
governing processes involve a resolution of conflicting interest, with sufficient responsibility for
balancing governmental needs and resources.
Thus,
in the dµrisdictional allocation of individual
functions, there is an ever present danger of creating so many separate entities as to result in
undemocratic, inequitable, and inadequate assignment
of priorities.5
The potential economies from centralization should
be viewed carefully.

Centralization itself has costs,

and they tend to increase as centralization becomes
extensive.

Any function can be centralized.

However,

there is a point where economies gained through centralization begin to diminish and eventually become diseconomies.
Even so, centralization does allow a grouping of activities,
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bulk purchases of supplies, the sharing of capital
equipment and facilities and other practices which
can lower overall costs.

Formal cooperative service delivery

systems do involve centralization.

However, the centraliz-

ing involved can vary widely in form and degree.
The desirability of cooperation varies from service
to service.

Werner

z.

Hirsch has studied the local versus
6
areawide service delivery problem·.
He has developed
some criteria to help in the decision as to whether or
not communities would benefit from consolidating their
service delivery systems into an areawide system.

He

looked at these criteria for each function or service that
a community provides.

The criteria are:

the minimization

of spillovers, the maximization of scale economies, the
sufficiency of '. geographical area, legal and administrative
ability, functional sufficiency, controllability and
accessibility by constituents, and maximization of citizen
participation consistent with adequate performance.

These

criteria give the necessary information for three critical
considerations in organizing service delivery system-economics, administration and policy or politics.
The primary reason for considering reorganizing
municipal service delivery systems is economics.

In

delivering local services, it is most desirable to minimize
spillovers.

A spillover is when residents of one community

are impacted by any portion of the costs and/or benefits
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resulting from services provided by a municipal government
other than their own.

Spillovers are bound to occur

to some degree with any system; but, if "spill-ins" don't
offset "spill-outs", welfare inequities result.

It is

therefore desirable to adjust service delivery systems in
order to minimize spillovers.
For example, some roads which pass through a community
are used by motorists other than residents of that community.
Others are benefiting from road maintenance and repair
services provided by the community and paid for by
residents. There are spillovers.

Many communities have

similar roads, .roads used by non-resident motorists.
number and length of these road vary.
exist.

The

Welfare inequities

In order to compensate for the inequities the service

delivery systems of each community are adjusted.

Those

roadways which are used by non-residents are designated
county, state, interstate or US routes.

They are then

-

partially serviced by, or servicing by local highway departments is partially paid for by, that level of government
which best represents the regional jurisdiction from which
the non-resident motorists originate.
Maximization of scale economies and suff iency of
the geographical area for supporting a service delivery
system are the two other economic considerations.
vary with the service being delivered.

Both

They involve the

minimum and maximum capacities of the system(s) involved.
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There is a minimum and maximum geographic area within
which any system can effectively and efficiently service.
Geographic area sufficiency is closely tied to the
scale of the service system.

The scale at which the system

is most efficient is determined by the laws of economies of
scale and diminishing returns to scale.

Therefore, the

geographic area and the scale of the system are critical
economic factors which should be considered in relation to
one another.
There are two administrative criteria in the Hirsch
model.

They are:

legal and administrative ability, and

functional sufficiency.

If an areawide service system is

set up, it is better if its organization includes
administration and its administrative body has legally delegated powers.

Adminstration by local governments or a

board of representatives from them is not good.

A full

time administrator and staff with the power to make
adminstrative decisions is necessary for the system to
operate as efficiently and as effectively as possible.
If administration is done by a board or remotely from local
governments, decisions will be slow, costing time and
money.

A board is useful for policy decisions but

not for administrative decisions.

If provisions are made

for an administrator and staff but no legal powers are
given to them, their decisions may not be carried out, their
commands have no standing.

19

Policy or politics must also be considered; and,
provisions for them must be incorporated in decisions about
orga,niza.ti.on an areawide service delivery system.

Two

criteria which Hirsch has established for this purpose
are:

controllability and accessibility of contituents,

and maximization of

citizen participation.

The affected

public, those people for whom the system operates, should
be involved in policy decisions, decisions such as what
functions will be incorporated in the areawide system, what
level of services will be offered, and what the priorities
involved are.

In a local community, the resident$

~ake

these decisions through voting, and through their elected
representatives.

Their interests are represented when

decisions are made regarding levels and/or combinations of
services, or whether or not to continue operating the system.
Citizens cannot be included in every decision (such as
adminstrative decisions); however, meaningful citizen
participation can be consistent with adequate performance
of the system.

In addition to involvement in policy-making,

clients should be provided with means of communicating with
the system.

They should have an easy way to commend or

criticize the services they receive.
essential
and

Feedback is

for efficient and effective delivery of services

a,dequ~temechanisms

for communicating with the affected

public are necessary in order to receive feedback.

20

Hirsch tested his criteria on eighteen traditional
urban service functions.
results.

Table 1.

The following tables show the

summarizes the results of testing two

criteria used to determine whether or not the services
themselves favor local or areawide operation.
considered were
economies and

(1)
(2)

The criteria

the expectation of important scale
the necessity of political proximity.

It was found that important scale economies could be
expected from eight of the eighteen services considered.
The second criteria was the proximity of people to the
bureaucracy of the individual service system and to the
general governmental bodies which make policies for the
individual systems.

It was found that close proximity

of the people to the government was particularly important
with six services.

There were eight services where

political proximity was found to be of little consequence.
With the remaining four services it was found that closeness
of the people to the government was important sometimes and
not other times.
Table 2 shows the results from testing two criteria
used to determine who should finance what services (at what
level of government should assessments be made and resources
allocated).

The criteria which were used were the

expectation of benefit spill-overs from the services and
the role of - income redistribution in delivering services.
Of the eighteen services considered, in only ten could
major spillover benefits be expected; and, with only six
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TABLE 1
URBAN GOVERNMENT SERVICES FAVORING
LOCAL vs. AREAWIDE OPERATION

Services

Important
scale economies
can be expected

Air pollution control

yes

no

Education

no

yes

Fire protection

no

yes

Hospitals

yes

no

Libraries

no

yes

Neighborhood parks
& recreation

no

yes and no

Planning

yes

yes and no

Police

no

yes

Power

yes

no

Public health services

yes

no

Public housing

no

yes

Public welfare services

no

yes

Refuse collection

no

no

Sewage disposal

yes

no

Street maintenance

no

no

Transportation

yes

yes and no

Urban renewal

no

yes and no

SOURCE:

Political proximity is considered essential

National Tax Journal, "Urban Government Services",
Werner z. Hirsch, p. 333.
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TABLE 2
URBAN GOVERNMENT SERVICES FAVORING LOCAL
vs. AREAWIDE vs. NATIONWIDE FINANCING

Major
benefit spillovers
can be expected

Income
redistribution
plays an important role

Air pollution control

yes

no

Education

yes

yes

Fire protection

no

no

Hospitals

yes

yes

Libraries

no

no

Neighborhood parks
& recreation

no

no

Planning

yes

no

Police

no

no

Power

no

no

Public health services

yes

yes

Public housing

yes

yes

Public welfare services

no

yes

Refuse collection

no

no

Sewage disposal

yes

no

Street maintenance

yes

no

Transportation

yes

no

Urban renewal

yes

no

SOURCE:

National Tax Journal, "Urban Government Services'.',
Werner Z. Hirsch, p. 336.
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of the eighteen did income redistribution play an
important role.
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations has also studied interlocal cooperation.

A part

of their study, somewhat applicable, is the reasons
communities gave for participating or not participating in
regional councils (formal cooperative organizations).
They asked a set of questions of local governments regarding why they participated in the formation of regional
councils (see Table 3).

The most important reason

given

by the communities sampled was to initiate cooperative
approaches to solving regional problems.

A second survey

was done questioning why communities joined regional
councils (see Table 4).

A similar reason was most

frequently given as most important.

The second most

important reason given for participating in regional
councils (in both surveys) was that it was necessary to
obtain Federal funds.

A pattern of responses to these

surveys and the two most important reasons for

participat-

ing in regional councils was recognized by the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.

Larger

communities over 100,000 population participated primarily
for the second reason, to obtain Federal funds, while smaller
ones did so mainly for the first reason, to reach solutions
to local problems.

TABLE 3
REASONS GIVEN BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR FORMING REGIONAL COUNCILS:

Reason

Total

Number of
Cities
Reporting

Weighted
Mean*

987

1972

Number of
Counties
Reporting

Weighted
Mean*

629

Initiate cooperative approaches to
solving general regional problems

829

1. 5

531

1. 5

Meet serious problem in a specific
funcitonal area

228

2.4

153

2.5

Formalize previous informal cooperative
arrangements

282

2.6

160

2.5

94

2.3

64

2.3

Compliance with planning requirements
of Federal grant-in-aid programs

723

1. 8

498

1. 9

Compliance with areawide review requirements under Section 204 and
Circular A-95

295

2.4

199

2.4

Offset some State action or threat
of action

SOURCE:

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Regional Decision Making:
New Strategies for Substate Districts.
Table IV-2, page 117.

*Respondents

were asked to rank in order of importance the three major reasons that their
regional council was formed (one being the most important reason, 2 and 3 being the next
most important reasons.)

N

*"'

TABLE 4
REASONS GIVEN BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR JOINING REGIONAL COUNCILS:

Reason

Total

Number of
Cities
Reporting

Weighted
Mean*

810

1972

Number of
Counties
Reporting

Weighted
Mean*

573

Forum for discussion of regional
problems

413

2.0

277

1. 9

Contribute significantly to solution
of areawide problems

564

1. 8

407

1. 8

Contribute significantly to solution
of local problems

322

2.1

272

2.0

Improve cooperation between central
city and suburbs

169

2.3

83

2.6

Necessary to obtain Federal funds

463

1. 8

393

1. 8

Necessary to obtain State funds

146

2.2

124

2.3

Concurrence with idea although doubtful
of any real local benefits

104

2.4

73

2.4

SOURCE:

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.
Regional Decision Making:
New Strategies for Substate Districts.
Table IV-3, page 118.

* Respondents were asked to rank in order of importance the three major reasons why their
regional council was formed (one being the most important reason; 2 and 3 the next most
important reasons).

N
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Another survey was undertaken to determine
why communities did not participate in regional councils
(see Table 5).

The most important reason given was that

they are too often dominated by the largest communities.
This reason was closely followed by three others:

the

planning and delivery of services were thought to be
better performed at the local level; such organizations
caused unnecessary administrative delays to Federal funding
of local programs; and, the councils were seen as too
costly to local taxpayers.
Several inferences might be gained from the
responses to these three surveys.

First, communities

seem to be interested in working with one another.
While Federal programs have induced larger communities
into undertaking cooperative ventures when they might not
have otherwise done so, smaller communities indicated that
they were primarily motivated by a desire to solve their
individual problems, as well as the problems of their
neighbors.

Second, the majority of communities see

regional council as an arena or forum in which cooperation
can be initiated.
Would these same communities who indicated that their
primary reason for participating in a formal organization
was to meet local needs on an areawide basis join together
with one another if there were no formal mechanisms
facilitating it?

One of the surveys did indicate that

TABLE 5
REASONS FOR LOCAL NON-MEMBERSHIP IN REGIONAL COUNCILS:

1972

Number of
Cities
Reporting

Percent
of
Total

155

100

49

100

Weakened influence in State and
Federal policy decisions

11

7

6

12

Unnecessary red tape delaying Federal
funding of local programs

32

21

16

33

4

3

4

8

Planning and delivery of services could
be performed better at local level
than at regional level

33

21

23

47

Too costly to taxpayers

30

19

15

31

Domination by largest county or
central city

36

23

20

41

4

3

56

36

22

45

Reason

Total

Regional council would receive Federal
and State funds otherwise allocated
to local government

Domination by many smaller governments
Other

SOURCE:

Number of
Counties
Reporting

Percent
of
total

The Advisor¥ Commission in Intergovernmental Relations
Regional Decision Making:
New Strategies for Substate Districts.
Table IV-1, page 116.
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about twenty percent of the respondents were participating
in formal cooperative arrangements before joining a regional
council.

It is unclear from the summary of the survey

whether the twenty percent joined a regional council because
they outgrew their informal arrangements or because they
had other problems with the agreements which could only be
corrected by formalizing them.
The following section is an examination of cooperation
among three communities.
informal

~greements

They are all participating in

which they make as a need arises; and,

they have indicated that

they have had no problems

resulting from the fact that they are not cooperating
formally.

III.

INTERLOCAL COOPERATION AND THE DELIVERY
OF POLICE AND PUBLIC WORKS SERVICES
IN THREE COMMUNITIES

The organization of service delivery systems in
three communities are examined here to aid in the application of concepts of cooperation among them.

The

communities are Framingham, Natick and Wellesley.

They are

contiguous communities in the South Middlesex area of
Massachusetts.

Land use in each is mixed.

A major portion

of it is single family sprawl-type development.

However,

Framingham in the recent past, and Natick most recently,
have incurred sharp increases in the construction of
multi-family dwellings.

In addition to residential uses,

a dense core of commercial and business establishments
extends through Natick and Framingham (and less densely
through Wellesley) along several state highways.

Indus-

tries are located in all three communities, also along
major highways.

The entire South Middlesex area is

rapidly growing, and, Framingham, Natick, Wellesley and
the communities about

them have been identified as an

SMSA by the Bureau of the Census for the 1980 census.
All three communities have a town meeting form of
government with a board of selectmen who oversee government functions.

In addition, Framingham has an executive

administrator (town manager) in charge of day to day
activities (since the board of selectmen meet only weekly).

FIGURE 1
MAP OF FRAMINGHAM, NATICK AND WELLESLEY
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All departments (and therefore all services the town provides) are overseen by elected or appointed boards,
conunissions and committees.

For example, the school

committee oversees the operation of the school department,
the board of public works oversees the activities of the
department of public works (see Figures 2, 3 and 4).
Framingham is the largest of the three communities
both in population and in area.

Approximately 68,000

people live in this 25-1/2 square mile community.

There

are 19 boards or commissions overseeing governmental
activities amounting to the involvement of over 100
residents in the delivery of services.

In addition, 211

residents participate in policy-making as town meeting
.

representa t ives.

7

Natick is the second largest with more than 31,000
people living on 16 square miles of land.

There are 46

boards or commissions involving more than 225 residents
in governmental activities.

In addition, there are 240

residents who are town meeting representatives partaking
.
in
po l 'icy-ma k'ing.

8

Approximately 27,000 people live in Wellesley.
Wellesley covers about 10-1/4 square miles.

10

9

More than

137 people are involved in some 28 to 30 boards or com11
missions overseeing departmental operations.
There are
also 240 people representing the residents in policy-making
.
12
at town meetings.

FIGURE 2
ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE FRAMINGHAM TOWN GOVERNMENT

voters
Moderators

Town
Clerk

Town Meeting
Members

Trustees of
Town Library

Constables

Redevelopment
Authority

Planning Housing
Authority
Board

(appoint)
finance committee
capital budget committee
personnel board
loring arena committee
committee studying changes in government

Trustees of
Old Bur:i:al
Ground

Trustees of
Edgell Grove
Cemetary

Commissioners
of Trust
Funds

Tree
Warden

Board of
Public
Health

Park
Commissioners

Commissioners
of Public
Works

School Committee
(_appoints)
superintendent
associate
superintendent

Selectmen
,--------treasurer-collector
assessors
purchasing agent
compensation agent
registrars of voters
contributory
retirement board
director of veterans
services & burial
agent
town forest committee
historical commission

I

-(.appoint)
conservation commission
industrial development
commission
zba associate members
council for aging
trustees of edwards cemetary
trustees of old so. cemetary
town constable
town accountant
dog officer/pound keeper
assistant dog officer
fire chief/forest warden

SOURCE: Town of Framingham. 277th Annual Report:l977.
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special police officers
civil defense director
civil defense advisory
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sealer of weights and
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deputy inspector of w & m
sworn weighers
inspector of animals
housing inspector
gas inspector
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----1

Executive Administrator
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planning director
town engineer
zonin9 board of appeals
chief of police
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w
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f\..l
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building inspector
deputy building inspector
ass't building inspectors

FIGURE

3

' ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE NATICK TOWN GOVERNMENT
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SOURCE: League of Women Voters. Know Natick. page 14.
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FIGURE 4
ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE WELLESLEY TOWN GOVERNMENT
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Moderator
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SOURCE: Town of Wellesley. 1978 Annual Report.
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A closer examination of the organizations of
service systems is necessary for evaluation and recommendation of potentials for interlocal cooperation.

Two

departments in each of the three communities were reviewed,
the department of public works and the police department.
The services provided by each department vary from
community to community.
organizations vary.

In addition, their administrative

No formal cooperation exists between

the three communities with either of the two services.
However, each of the two departments in each community does
engage in informal agreements.

The reason given by both

departments in each community for having informal but not
formal agreements is that there is no need for formal
13
.
. f orma 1 ones su ff ice.
.
agreemen t s a t th e presen t time,
in
Public works departments were examined for the
services they offer and their organization.

The public

works department of Framingham is broken up into four
divisions--highways, water, sewer and sanitation (see
Figure 5).

Each has working foremen and workers.

Their

activities are coordinated by a central administrator and
an assistant administrator.

There is an administrative

staff as well as two auxiliary functions:

utilities and

streets construction inspector and auto service.

Even

though Framingham has organized four services within one
department there is still a general administrator for each
division (superintendents).

The services may be benefiting

by sharing clerical personnel and by increased coordination,

FIGURE 5
ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE FRAMINGHAM PUBLI C WORKS DEPARTMENT

Board of Public Works

.I
. I.

Director

Assistant Director

Off ice Manager

Garage Supervisor

billing supervisor(l)
clerks (7)

mechanics (7)
painter (1)
welder ( 1)

Highway
Division
superintendent (1)
construction
foreman (1)
working foremen(5)
workers (31)
clerk (1)

Sanitation
Division
superintendent (1)
construction
foreman (1)
working foremen(3)
route supervisor(l)
workers (51)
clerk (1)

Inspector for Construction
of Streets & Utilities

Water
Division
superintendent (1)
construction
foreman (1)
working foremen(2)
workers (15)
clerk (1)

Sewer
Division
superintendent(l)
construction
foreman (1)
working foreman(D
workers (14)
clerk (1)

w

SOURCE: Interview with Ralph Chipman, 'Department o f Public Works, Framingham, Massachusetts, March 1979.
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but the director, assistant director and office manager are
three additional (highly paid) positions resulting from the
grouping of the services.
Within the town's bureaucracy, the public works
department relies on the work of the engineering department
which is a separately functioning department.

It also

relies on the auxilliary services of the general government
such as the treasurer, purchasing and personnel.

Informal

interaction between department heads occurs all the time.
The public works department operates the municipal garage
for maintenance and repair of all equipment and vehicles
except the fire department's.
With the highway and water divisions, informal agreements exist.

They are practical working agreements with

the supervisors of the same departments of neighboring
communities.

For example, the water division has some

agreements with Natick.

Their pipes are connected with

gates closing them off from each other most of the time.
However, if water pressure gets too low on the border of
one town, they call up the other and request that they open
up the gates until the pressure builds back up.
Agreements also exist with other towns regarding
sewer and sanitation services.

Ashland (and maybe Southboro

in the near future), a small neighboring community pumps
their sewage through Framingham's pipes to get to the MDC
mains (which carry the sewage to a treatment facility on
Deer Island) .

The public works department sends them a

38

bill (according to a contract) for the services.

The

sanitation division of the department operates an incinerator.

The town of Ashland makes use of it.

similar to that for sewer service.

Billing is

The town has formal

agreements, contracts, with the MDC.

With them it

purchases most of the water residents use from the MDC.

It

supplements MDC water with its own wells.
As far as citizen access is concerned, when people
have questions or problems about one of the public works
services in Framingham, they call that division.
is direct and easily facilitated.

Feedback

In Natick, feedback is

channeled through the main off ice of the public works
department.

The office relays messages to the individual

departments.
Natick's public works department also has four
divisions (departments within the overall department),
however it differs from Framingham's slightly (see Figure
6).

There are highway and sanitation departments just as

there are in Framingham.

The water and sewer divisions are

combined into one department and the maintenance garage is
a separate department.

There are no superintendents admin-

istering over the individual departments; there are
expert/supervisors in charge of them. There are also working
foremen and workers in each.

A director and an assistant

director oversee all activities.
has a dual function.

The assistant director

He is also the chief engineer (expert/

supervisor of the engineering department) .

The engineering

FIGURE 6
ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE NATICK PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT
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w

SOURCE: Interview with Edwin Fannon, Department of Public Works, Natick, Massachusetts, March 1979.
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department is within the department of public works
umbrella.

There is also an office administrator who super-

vises a staff of clerks.

The office work is for the

overall department, individual departments within it and
the public works board.
Natick has both formal and informal agreements for
service cooperation with neighboring communities.

The

informal water agreement with Framingham has been mentioned.
A similar, but formal (written contract) agreement exists
with Wellesley.

There are also sewer agreements.

These

agreements exist primarily because of natural barriers
(streams, ledges, etc.) which make service provision by
Natick's DPW too costly.

Service is thereby provided by

neighboring communities who bill the individuals receiving
the service directly.

In addition, Dover does not have a

sewer system so individual hookups are allowed through
individual agreements and through a trust.

Agreements also

exist with the state and with Dover to allow Natick (DPW)
to search for water on property within their jurisdictions.
Within Dover, Natick operates and maintains the pumps in
exchange for some of the water.
Dover.

Natick pumps the rest into

There is also informal mutual aid in the form of

exchanges of supplies.

For example, if Natick needs a part

and Framingham has one, Natick buys it from them.
Wellesley's public works department differs from
Framingham's and Natick's in that there are more divisions
(see Figure 7).

It has a highway and a sanitation division.

FIGURE 7
ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE WELLESLEY PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT
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SOtlRCE: Town of Wellesley. 1978 Annual Report.
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It also has a combined water-sewer division and the
engineering function is a division of the department of
public works, as they are in Natick.

However, in addition

to these divisions it also has a park division and an
electrical division.

The park division is responsible for

the construction and maintenance of the town's parks.

The

electrical division generates and distributes electricity.
It also installs, maintains and repairs traffic signals,
fire alarms and police communications.
The department has a general director and an assistant director who is also the town engineer (like Natick).
Like the public works departments in Natick and Framingham,
Wellesley's has an administrative staff segment, office
functions, which they call the financial branch.

Each

division within the department of public works has a superintendent with the exception of the park division
has a general foreman.

which

Wellesley's department of public

works seems to be similar to Framingham's in that there are
many supervisors.

The highway division, for example, has

a superintendent, an assistant superintendent, two general
foremen and four working foremen to coordinate the work of
only thirty-nine workers.
The public works departments of the three towns vary
in the services they deliver and in their organizational
management.
delivers.

Table 6 is a comparison of the services each
A formalized cooperative system of public works

services with a centralized bureaucracy would require

TABLE 6
RESPONSIBILITY FOR DELIVERING CERTAIN SERVICES
Service
electric generation and distribution
engineering
fire alarms/police communications/
traffic signals: installation
and repair
highways: construction
maintenance
snowplowing
cleaning
municipal garage
park development and upkeep
sewerage
solid waste: collection
landfill
incineration
recycling
tree planting, maintenance and removal
waterworks
DPW
EDIS
ENG
FD
FOR
MDC
PRIV
REC

Framingham

Natick

Wellesley

EDIS
ENG

EDIS
DPW

DPW
DPW

FD

FD

DPW

PRIV
DPW
DPW
DPW
DPW
REC
DPW/MDC
DPW

PRIV
DPW
DPW
DPW
DPW
REC
DPW/MDC
DPW
DPW

PRIV
DPW
DPW
DPW
DPW
DPW
DPW/MDC
DPW

DPW
FOR
MDC/DPW

FOR
DPW

PRIV
DPW
DPW
DPW/MDC

Town Department of Public Works
Boston Edison Company
Town Engineering Department
Town Fire Department
Town Forestry/Tree Department
Metropolitan District Commission
Private Contractors
Town Recreation and Parks Department
~

SOURCE:

Compiled from town budgets and interviews, March, 1979.
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extensive organizational development not only within the
public works departments of the three towns but also
within the entire governments.

Individual services could

be separated out, such as water, sewer, highways and
sanitation, and centralized; however, problems with
operational procedures and equipment do exist, especially
with water, sewer and sanitation.
With water, Natick and Wellesley rely on wells while
Framingham relies on MDC surface water.

The equipment is

different (values in the pipes operate differently) .

The

region would have to be divided up into districts with
certain specially trained personnel assigned to each
district.

Supervisors would then be required for coordin-

ating activities of the personnel of each.
any advantages from centralization.

Thus losing

The situation is

similar with sewerage.
With sanitation, Framingham operates an incinerator
while Natick a landfill; and Wellesley contracts a private
incinerator and recycles recyclables.

All three could use

Frarningham's incinerator; however, because of transportation
costs it would probably be cheaper to divide the region
into districts again using all three disposal methods.

The

end result would be a system operating in a similar fashion
to the present one only administered by a larger, more
centralized bureaucracy.

Benefits would accrue to the

towns from a formal centralized structure; however, it is
more than likely that the costs will outweigh the benefits.
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Each of the three communities has their own police
departments.

The departments are similar in that they

each provide several basic services--public education about
crime, police patrol, crime follow-up, overnight lock-up,
traffic and parking control, and firearms control.

The

organizations examined here are those of Framingham and
Natick.

The organization chart of Wellesley's police

department was unavailable.
Framingham's police department, like Natick's and
Wellesley's is administered by a chief.

The chief is not

only an expert in the operations of the services delivered
by the department but also the administrator.

In

Framingham the chief has a staff for training, community
services, and planning and research finance.

Other admin-

istrative functions are organized in a separate bureau (one
of three) under the executive officer, the bureau of
services.

This division includes administrative functions

(personnel, records, etc.) safety (traffic control,
parking, etc.) and inspections (personnel operations and
equipment) .
The two other divisions (bureaus) under the executive officer are operations and investigation.

Operations

is divided into shifts (three eight hour shifts) .

The

functions of this division are communications and control.
The investigation division is divided by function.

It

includes a detective and rape unit, a juvenile unit, photo
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and identification unit, and a legal unit.

Figure 8 shows

the organization of the Framingham Police Department.
Natick's police department has a somewhat similar
hierarchy (see Figure 9).

There is a chief and an

executive of f icer (who functions as prosecutor).

There is

an operations division and an investigative division.
However, the staff and bureau of services divisions of the
Framingham police department are combined under a single
unit of administrative staff in Natick.
Informal agreements for mutual assistance do exist
between Framingham, Natick, Wellesley and all neighboring
communities.

By law, policemen have jurisdiction within

their communities, and one thousand rods over their borders
into neighboring communities.

All police departments

usually respect the borders except when informal agreements
for patrol within the one thousand rod zone and when aid
requested.

If aid is requested, temporary police powers

within the community requesting the assistance are granted
to officers requested to enter.

If there is some emergency

and officers of one community have not yet been requested
by the other, the entering officers still could make
arrests under citizen arrest laws.
An example of mutual assistance occurred one night
when police were called to break up a brawl at a restaurant/bar.

The establishment is in Framingham but only

several hundred feet from the Natick border.
Framingham police were called.
sent policement to the scene.

The

The Framingham dispatcher
The site, however, .is in a

FIGURE 8
ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE FRAMINGHAM POLICE DEPARTMENT
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SOURCE: Interview with Lt. Ferrazzi, Police Department, Framingham, Massachusetts, March 1979.
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FIGURE 9
ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE NATICK POLICE DEPARTMENT
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remote corner of the town and it takes more time than
usual for policemen to respond.

The Framingham dispatcher

notified the Natick dispatcher that assistance was desired.
The Natick dispatcher was already monitoring Framingham's
communications (a regional communications system exists to
improve mutual assistance response time) and sending
patrolmen toward the scene.

Natick police arrived first,

broke up the brawl and made arrests.

Upon arrival,

Framingham police backed up the Natick police.
Interlocal cooperation with regards to police
services also exist between Natick and Framingham in the
form of training (mutual practices and drills).

In

addition, ideas and information (dealing with administration
and operations) are shared among all communities through
both informal and formal mechanisms.

For example, the

Natick police department recently contracted cohorts in
the towns of Sanwich and Wayland regarding grant writing
and application procedures (these towns recently received
money to purchase motorcycle and a videotape machine) .
Formal mechanisms such as the state organizations of safety
officers and drug enforcement officers, and police chief
associations facilitate the exchange of information and
ideas.

Some police departments also exchange personnel

(temporarily) for undercover investigations.

Local police

also assist and receive assistance from state police.
Local policebackup state police on calls and the state
police in turn assist local police with investigations and
chemical analyses.
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An institutional structure could be a desirable forum
for facilitating and generating discussion.
departments have organizations

The police

forbrin~ingtogether

individuals involved in similar functions among them for
the exchange of ideas.

For example, there is a state

organization of safety officers, an organization of drug
enforcement officers and a police chiefs association.
Their organizations provide a common meeting place for discussing mutual problems and for the exchange of possible
solutions.
A formal collaborativ e effort was attempted on the
14
county level.
''It started out big but fissled out."
Suffolk County is attempting to initiate a formal information exchange.

Instead of bringing individuals together

it will require monthly reports and redistribute them to
each department within the county.

This will provide a

regular exchange of information and the organizations will
facilitate face to face interaction.

The officers inter-

viewed felt that no other formal mechanisms or institutional
structures were necessary.
A formal centralized police department, a regional
organization to facilitate interlocal interaction and to
gain benefits from economies of scale seems to be both
unnecessary (as far as facilitating interaction) and
legislatively difficult (because of the geographical
limitations on powers of officers).

The centralized

bureaucracy could coordinate activities of divisions based
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on local boundaries.

It seems, however, that coordination

that is presently necessary already exists informally, and
a formal superstructure would merely add personnel and
facilities whose cost probably could not be recouped
through economies of scale.
The public works departments of the communities
studied do have organizations similar to the police departments.

They have no forum in which discussion can be

facilitated.

Initiatives require more effort on the part

of the individual communities.

As a result interaction

and cooperation has been dyadic in nature.

This may not be

that bad, though, because their needs seem to justify such
interaction.
Since police officers are legislatively confined to
their communities their efforts in collaborating focus on
operational procedures and information.
services are not so restricted.
services across local boundaries.

Public works

They can extend their
They use semi-permanent

capital equipment in some of their services, such as water
and sewer pipes and pumps.

Therefore, they cannot reorgan-

ize operations such as police departments can.

In order

to efficiently and effectively accommodate development and
provide services they turn toward their neighbors for
assistance in providing the services.
Formal organizations for the discussion of problems
and the exchange of information about the delivery of water
and sewer services might not be worth the time involved.
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With other public works services (such as highway maintenance, refuse collection and disposal, and park
construction and maintenance) such an organization might
be helpful.

Since assessment for such services is more

difficult to calculate than for water or sewer services,
and since communities usually purchase only enough equipment and facilities to service themselves it is more
difficult to extend such services beyond local boundaries.
Therefore, procedures of delivery become more important.
Organizations such as those police departments participate
in would provide a forum for the exchange of ideas and
the initiation of discussion.
It is not recommended that a centralized cooperative
organization of police services or public works services
be formed.

Such an organization would require extensive

reorganization of the departments involved as well as the
governments of the communities in general.

A centralized

bureaucracy in each of the service systems could coordinate
the activities of the divisions of each among the communities involved.

However, it seems that with police

services, the coordination presently necessary already
exists; and with public works services, problems relating
to operational procedures and equipment used might be too
complicated and costly to overcome.

Such a formal

centralized superstructure would also add personnel and
facilities whose cost probably could not be recouped
through economics of scale.
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The towns studied here are already cooperating with
one another in the delivery of services because it allows
them to deliver services more efficiently and effectively.
Even though cooperation is primarily informal (verbal
agreements between administrators of departments of each
community), it is working.

To suggest that informal agree-

ments should be replaced with formal ones simply because
they, theoretically, are more dependable (because they have
some legal standing to fall back on) is questionable in
this situation and as a general practice.

Certainly there

is more security in formal agreements than in informal
ones, even if it is primarily psychological; but, making
informal agreements is easier and less time consuming.
The informal cooperative efforts which these communities
have undertaken are more appropriate than formal ones
given the administrative and organizational constraints
present.

IV.

CONCLUSIONS

If communities prefer different governmental organizations and procedures to make policy and deliver services,
then why should they change to facilitate the use of formal
systems to cooperate with each other.

This is what would

be required for some formal mechanisms, such as special
districts.

Other formal mechanisms, such as councils of

governments, are hampered by these differences.

Even

though they provide a forum for initiating agreements and
structure for formulating and carrying them out, they do
so at a cost.

The primary cost is time, delays caused by

superficial discussions and "red :tape".
When communities informally cooperate in the delivery
of services they seem to avoid these problems.

Yet, the

Adivsory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has
stated that informal cooperation is unsuccessful at meeting
nine objectives which they regard as desirable in areawide
.
d e l"ivery. 14
service

It says:

.
d oes not f aci. 1.itate
t h at it

an adequate geographic area of jurisdiction; that spillover
costs and benefits cannot be contained within the area of
jurisdiction responsible for providing service; that it
does not facilitate an adequate geographic area of jurisdiction; that spillover costs and benefits cannot be
contained

within the area of jurisdiction responsible
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for providing service; that it does not allow for the
resolution of conflicts and the balancing of needs and
resources; and, that it does not facilitate other objectives desirable of a cooperative system (see Table 7).
The Commission compares informal cooperation with other
mechanisms and summarizes their conclusions in a chart.
The chart is a continuum showing the effectiveness of
areawide service delivery approaches versus their feasibility or political acceptibility (see Figure 10).

It says

that informal cooperation is the most politically feasible
of thirteen alternatives; but at the same time, it is the
least effective.

15

It is true that informal cooperation does not respect
the criteria of an areawide service delivery system,
criteria which communities should try to meet when setting
up a system.

However, the nature of informal cooperation is

different from other, more formal, cooperative systems.
Formal systems are comprehensive approaches to meeting
service needs.

They are a mechanism prepared for most of

the possible areawide problems (or needs) a system might be
confronted with in its future.

Informal cooperation is an

incremental approach to meeting service needs.

It allows

communities to face problems (or needs) as they arise.

It

allows communities to more efficiently and effectively use
their present service systems, to compensate for their
inadequacies.

TABLE 7
AREAWIDE SERVICE DELIVERY APPROACHES AND OBJECTIVES

Type of areawide
approach

Adequate
geographic
area of
jurisdiction

Legal and
administrative
ability to
perform assigned
services and
implement plans

Contain spillover costs and
benefits within
jurisdiction
responsible for
providing service

Multifunctional;
governing
Permit
processes involve
realization
resolution
of economies of conflicting
of scale: interests and
Staff/Line balancing of needs
and resources

Increase
Ensure
coordination of equitable
local projects distribution
with areawide
of
functional
public goods
and comprehen- and services
sive development
plans

Performance
of functions
remains
Maximize
controllable
citizen
by and
participation
jurisdiction
is accountable
directly to residents

Informal
Cooperation
Service contract/
joint services
agreement

0

+

0

+

+

Regional council
of local elected
officials

+

-

-

+

-

+

+

Federally encouraged
substate district +

-

-

·0

-

-

State planning and
development
district

+

0

-

0

-

+

Local special
district

+

+

0

+

+

Transfer of
functions

0

+

0

+

+

Annexation

+

0

-

0

+

-

0

+

-

0

0

-

0

0

+

+

0

+

+

+

0

+

+

+

0

special
district/
public authority

+

+

+

+

+

-

-

a

"Unbrella" regional
council

+

+

0

+

+

+

+

-

0

Urban county

0

+

0

+

+

+

0

+

+

+

City-county
consolidation

0

+

0

+

+

+

0

+

+

+

Federated areawide government

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

~reawide

KEY
SOURCE:

+

= successful

0

=

+
+
occasionally successful

= unsuccessful

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.
Regional Decision Making: New Strategies for Substate Districts.
Table I-2, page 12.
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This is a viable approach to interlocal cooperation
in the delivery of services.

Assuming that communities

are the basic building blocks for solving areawide problems,
any form of cooperation must respect them as individual
entities.

Certainly, they are not isolated from one

another; there are issues dealing with the delivery of
services which do not respect local boundaries.

These

issues must be dealt with, and informal cooperation is a
method of doing so while at the same time respecting the
autonomy of communities.
Home rule is a critical issue when considering interlocal cooperation.

Equally important, however, are issues

dealing with economics, administration and citizen access
and control.

Formal systems are necessary in some situa-

tions, especially when comprehensiveness in meeting the
Advisory Commission's nine objectives.

But in other

situations, formal systems are either not necessary or
require extensive reorganization of local governments in
order to be facilitated.

Therefore, it is the conclusion

of this analysis that informal cooperation has its place,
and that communities should cooperate with one another in
the delivery of services in whatever formal or informal
manner their organizational and administrative situations
necessitate.
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